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Commentary
By Earl M. Maltz*
The Expansion of the Role of the
Effects Test in Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Analysis
The effects test, first developed in connection with litigation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 has become perhaps
the single most dominant feature of antidiscrimination law in
America, notwithstanding the unwillingness of the Supreme Court
to apply the test to constitutional claims. 2 Courts and administra-
tive agencies have expanded the application of the effects test to
types of employment discrimination not covered by Title V11 3 and
to discrimination outside the area of employment.4 This commen-
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. BA., 1972,
Northwestern University; J.D., 1975, Harvard University. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of Fred Harris.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1976)). See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). But see
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
3. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c) (2) (1979) (discrimination against handicapped).
See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.103 (1979) (discrimination on basis of age).
4. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (housing); 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (a) n.7 (1979) (granting
of credit).
In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Supreme Court seemed to indi-
cate that the effects test applied to cases under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color or national origin in any federally funded program. However, in
Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), five members of the Court
joined in concluding that the proscriptions of Title VI go no further than
those of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at
287 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 328-355 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ.). Since the equal protection clause only prohibits inten-
tional discrimination, see, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), Lau is apparently overruled on this point. See Board of Re-
gents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 352 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ.).
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tary will trace the outlines of the effects test analysis as it has
emerged in Title VII cases, and examine the ramifications of ex-
panding this analysis to other areas of the law.
I. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER TITLE VII
The effects test has its genesis in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.5 In
Griggs, the Court dealt with a challenge to a requirement that per-
sons either have a high school diploma or pass a standardized gen-
eral intelligence test as a condition of employment or transfer to
certain jobs. There was no showing that the requirement had been
adopted for the purpose of excluding blacks from certain jobs;6
however, the effect of the requirements was to exclude a higher
percentage of blacks than whites from desirable jobs. Moreover,
the employer had not demonstrated that possession of a high
school diploma or performance on the intelligence test was corre-
lated to success on the relevant jobs.7
Rejecting the employer's theory that a subjective intent to dis-
criminate was a necessary element of a violation of Title VII, the
Court held that the enforcement of the challenged requirements
violated the Civil Rights Act. Speaking for a unanimous Court,
Chief Justice Burger stated that
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidi-
ously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifi-
cations.
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is busi-
ness necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Ne-
groes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.8
The Court refined the effects test in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody.9 Like Griggs, the Moody decision dealt with an em-
ployer's use of a standardized aptitude test to select employees for
certain skilled jobs. The Court implemented a three-step analysis
in applying the effects test. First, the burden rests on the plaintiff
to show that the challenged employment practice had the requisite
disparate impact. If the plaintiff carries this burden then the em-
ployer must demonstrate that the requirement serves "the
employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy work-
5. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
6. Id. at 428.
7. Id. at 429.
8. Id. at 431.
9. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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manship.' "10 But such a showing is not necessarily dispositive; it
still remains open to the plaintiff to show that other tests or de-
vices might adequately serve the employer's interest without a
similar disparate impact.'
Each step in the Moody analysis raises important issues. The
first question is what type of statistical data will suffice to establish
disparate impact. The guidelines promulgated by the agency
charged with enforcing Title VII indicates that disparate impact
exists where one race (or sex) is less than eighty percent as likely
as another race to possess a given characteristic; 12 however, the
guidelines do not identify the relevant population to which the
Griggs analysis is to be applied. One commentator has suggested
that the requirement at issue should be measured against the po-
tential applicant pool as a whole.' 3 If this position were accepted,
then the most accurate method of measuring disparate impact
would probably involve the use of this statistics for the population
as a whole. Notwithstanding this, New York City Transit Authority
v. Beazer14 suggests that a different mode of analysis is appropri-
ate. In Beazer, the exclusion from employment of persons under-
going methadone maintenance treatment for heroin addiction was
challenged. Attempting to prove disparate impact, the plaintiffs in-
troduced evidence indicating that sixty-three percent of the per-
sons in public methadone maintenance programs were black or
Hispanic, while only 36.3% of the total population of New York City
was black or Hispanic.15 Questioning the sufficiency of these sta-
tistics, the majority opinion in Beazer noted:
10. Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801
(1973)).
11. Id.
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1979).
13. Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures
with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VI, 56 Tax. T. Rav. 1, 8 (1977). In
discussing the disparate impact problem, Professor Shoben seemed to con-
sider Griggs and its progeny to be interchangeable with cases such as Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). However, the
latter cases present a problem analytically quite different from that in
Griggs. Teamsters and Hazelwood were both cases in which the government
was attempting to prove that the defendants were engaged in a "pattern or
practice" of racial discrimination. in such cases, the government must prove
that the defendants intentionally discriminated on the basis of race in a sys-
tematic fashion. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335-36 & n.15 (1977). Statistics in such circumstances are only
evidence from which a relevant factor-intent--can be inferred. In Griggs,
intent was irrelevant; the disparate impact simpliciter was the critical factor.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
14. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
15. See id. at 584-86.
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We do not know... how many of these persons ever worked or sought
work for TA [the Transit Authority]. This statistic therefore reveals little
if anything about the racial composition of the class of TA job applicants
and employees receiving methadone treatment. More particularly, it tells
us nothing about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and employ-
ees .... The record demonstrates, in fact, that the figure is virtually irrel-
evant because a substantial portion of the persons included in it are either
unqualified for other reasons ... or have received successful assistance in
finding jobs with employers other than TA. 16
Beazer indicates that the effects test analysis should not be ap-
plied to the pool of all potential applicants, but rather to the group
of applicants who would be qualified for the position or positions in
the absence of the challenged requirements. Particularly where
the relevant job requires unusual qualifications, the racial or sex-
ual composition of the relevant applicant pool may differ signifi-
cantly from that of the general population. Thus, as Beazer
recognized, statistics on the general population should not inevita-
bly be considered definitive for the purpose of Title VII litigation.
Nonetheless, general population statistics have often been held
dispositive in Title VII cases. In Griggs, the Court indicated that
data which showed that thirty-four percent of the whites in the rel-
evant state had obtained a high school diploma while only twelve
percent of black males in the state had such a diploma 17 was suffi-
cient to establish the requisite disparate impact. The Court used a
similar technique in Dothard v. Rawlinson,18 in striking down re-
quirements for employment as a prison guard in Alabama. The
state required that the guards be at least five feet, two inches tall
and weigh at least one hundred and twenty pounds. Relying on
the fact that the restrictions together would operate to exclude less
than one percent of all American adult males but 41.13% of all
adult women and that each of the requirements individually would
have an analogous disproportionate effect,' 9 the Court found that
the imposition of such requirements violated Title VII.
The reliance on general population statistics in Griggs and
Dothard seems justified by two factors, notwithstanding the poten-
tial for unreliability of such general statistics. First, it may be diffi-
cult (if not impossible) to obtain statistics which directly measure
the effect of a given requirement on the pool of otherwise qualified
potential applicants. If more readily obtainable alternatives are
sufficiently reliable, there is little reason to place such a heavy bur-
den on plaintiffs. Second, in cases such as Dothard and Griggs,
the statistics from the general population showed such a great dis-
16. Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
17. See 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
18. 433 U.S. 320 (1977).
19. Id. at 329-30 & n.12.
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parate impact that even if the make-up of the pool of qualified ap-
plicants differed substantially from that of the population as a
whole, it seems highly unlikely that the disparity would have been
eliminated entirely. In such cases, general population statistics
are quite properly deemed sufficient. By contrast, where the dis-
parate impact on the population as a whole is less dramatic, as in
Beazer, the Court should demand more specific statistics.
The second critical issue raised by the Griggs-Moody analysis
is how closely the challenged requirement must relate to a busi-
ness purpose in the event the requirement is found to have a dis-
parate impact. Dothard makes clear that something more than a
marginal, indirect relationship to job performance is required.
There the Court seemed to concede that the challenged height and
weight restrictions were correlated with strength, and that some
degree of strength was necessary to effectively perform the func-
tions of a prison guard.20 Nonetheless, the Court found the imposi-
tion of the standards violative of Title VII. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the fact that there had been
no showing that the challenged requirements were related to any
specific level of strength which in turn was demonstrably neces-
sary for effective job performance.21 The Court also noted that if
the employer had truly been interested in testing for strength, it
could have done so directly, rather than circuitously through the
use of height and weight requirements. 22
Dothard clearly established that a marginal, indirect connec-
tion with a legitimate business purpose is insufficient to rebut the
prima facie case proved by showing disparate impact. Lower
courts have gone beyond even Dothard, however, mandating an
extremely strict approach to the concept of business relationship
expressed in Griggs. Typical is the language in Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp.,23 where the court stated:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business. Thus, the business ptirpose must be sufficiently compelling to
override any racial impact [and] the challenged practice must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve... 24
20. See id. at 331.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 332.
23. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972).
24. Id. at 798 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,
523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (adopting a similar test); Officers For Justice v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (adopting the Lorillard
standard). But see Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.
1977) (where disparate impact was not due to environmental or genetic char-
acteristics of protected group and rule had obvious job relationship, no statis-
tical showing was necessary).
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Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that such a strict ap-
proach may be inappropriate. For example, in Washington v. Da-
vis,25 the Court was faced with the question of the validity of a
written test which had to be passed in order to qualify as a police-
man. The test, which measured reading and comprehension, ver-
bal ability and vocabulary, had a racially disparate impact. While
there was evidence to support the conclusion that performance on
the test was related to performance in a job training program,
there was no evidence regarding any direct relationship between
performance on the test and actual effectiveness as a policeman.
Applying the same standards as those applicable under Title VII,26
the Court held the test to be sufficiently validated. Similarly, in
United States v. South Carolina,27 the Court affirmed a lower court
decision approving the use of a test based, on the test's demon-
strated relationship to success in a teacher training program,
rather than to actual performance as a teacher.2 8
If the Lorillard approach had been strictly applied, neither the
test in Davis nor that in South Carolina could have withstood
scrutiny under Title VII. In neither case was there a demonstra-
tion that the challenged criteria were related to an "overriding"
business purpose; rather, both cases relied on showings that per-
formance on tests predicted performance in training programs.
Moreover, while in each case completion of the training program
itself was on its face a valid job qualification, no attempt was made
in either case to establish the degree to which such programs con-
tributed to efficient employee performance. 29 Thus the Court
seems to be applying a less demanding standard than that sug-
gested by the court of appeals in Lorillard; the Davis Court ap-
peared to indicate that a "direct and positive" relationship to a
business purpose sufficed. 30
25. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
26. Title VII was not directly involved in Davis; however, in dealing with the vari-
ous statutory claims which were raised in the case, the Court noted that "de-
fendants ... appear not to have disputed that under the statutes and
regulations governing their conduct standards similar to those obtaining
under Ttle VII had to be satisfied." 426 U.S. at 249 (footnote omitted).
27. 434 U.S. 1026 (1978), aff'g without opinion, 15 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 6585 (D.S.C.
1977) (three judge court).
28. See 15 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. at 6598-99.
29. In Davis, the Court did state, however, that "[tihe advisability of the police
recruit training course informing the recruit about his upcoming job, ac-
quainting him with its demands, and attempting to impart a modicum of re-
quired skills seems conceded." 426 U.S. at 250.
30. See id. Davis did not discuss the technical requirements for evidence to
demonstrate such a relationship. Such requirements are described in Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431-36 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607 (1974)).
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But the Moody analysis does not end with a showing of busi-
ness relationship: even if such a relationship is demonstrated, the
plaintiff may still prevail if he can bring forward an alternative by
which the same purpose can be achieved. The significance of a
showing of a less discriminatory alternative [LDA] is not entirely
clear. Some lower courts have held that such a showing conclu-
sively condemns the challenged practice under Title VI.31 They
argue that under Griggs, disparate impact is only justifiable by
business necessity, and that where an LDA exists the impact is not
necessary to the function of the relevant business. 32
However, the formulation of the effects test in Moody suggests
a somewhat different role for the demonstration of the existence of
an LDA. There the Court noted that such a showing "would be
evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext'
for discrimination. '33 This language strongly indicates that the
question of the LDA is not directly relevant to the effects test per
se; rather, once the employer has satisfied the requirements of the
effects test, the existence of an LDA would support an inference
that he is engaging in intentional discrimination on the basis of
race or sex. There seems no good reason to exclude evidence that
would rebut such an inference. Thus, the existence of an LDA,
while probative, would not necessarily be dispositive of the em-
ployer's liability under Title VII.
This interpretation was strongly reinforced by the Court's dis-
position of Beazer. There the lower court had found that the requi-
site demonstration of disparate impact had been made by the
plaintiffs and concluded that the employer had made no adequate
showing of business necessity in response.34 As already noted, the
Supreme Court questioned the adequacy of the evidence of dispa-
rate impact;35 but in any event, the Court found that the employer
had rebutted any prima facie case of illegal discrimination.36
At this stage, if, as the lower courts have suggested, the exist-
ence of an LDA would have irrebuttably established the em-
ployer's liability notwithstanding its showing of a business
purpose, then the only appropriate course would have been for the
Court to remand the case to the district court for further proceed-
31. E.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 n.7 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 269-
70 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
32. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 n.7 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972).
33. 422 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
34. See 440 U.S. at 578-79.
35. See notes 14-16 & accompanying text supra.
36. 440 U.S. at 587 & n.31.
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ings. This issue is one of fact; thus, a trial court would be the only
appropriate forum to make an initial adjudication. But no such de-
termination had yet been made in Beazer; since the district court
had concluded that the employer had not met its own burden of
showing job-relatedness, the court had made no finding on the
LDA issue. Accordingly, if that issue were to be dispositive, the
Supreme Court was in no position to render a final judgment in
Beazer.
Nonetteless, the Court did not remand the case for further pro-
ceedings. Instead, the judgment for the plaintiffs was reversed
outright. The only portion of the opinion which even obliquely ad-
dressed the problem of the potential that an LDA existed was a
statement that "[t] he District Court's express finding that the rule
was not motivated by racial animus forecloses any claim in rebut-
tal that it was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. '37
But if the existence of an LDA entitled the plaintiff to judgment as
a matter of law irrespective of the presence or absence of actual
intent to discriminate then such a finding of intent by the district
court surely would not justify a failure to remand for consideration
of the LDA question.
On the other hand, if the existence of an LDA is only evidence
to be considered together with other evidence to determine actual
intent, then the action of the Beazer Court appears entirely logical.
The district court's conclusion that the promulgation of the chal-
lenged rule was not motivated by racial animus was a finding of
fact, reviewable only under the clearly erroneous standard. The
failure of the plaintiffs to introduce evidence-such as the exist-
ence of an LDA-which would support their case would not justify
a remand to reconsider such a finding. Consequently, the Court's
disposition of Beazer strongly suggests that the existence of an
LDA is only probative evidence of a Title VII violation, rather than
conclusive proof of such a violation.38
37. Id. at 587.
38. The Court's formulation of the effects test in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977), taken in isolation, might be viewed as suggesting a contrary con-
clusion. In Dothard, the Court never reached the issue of whether an LDA
was available; rather, it found that the employer had failed to demonstrate
the requisite business purpose for its qualifications which had a disparate
impact. But in purporting to restate the Moody criteria the Court noted that
"[i]f the employer proves that the challenged requirements are job related,
the plaintiff may then show that other selection devices without a similar dis-
criminatory effect would also 'serve the employer's legitimate interest in effi-
cient and trustworthy workmanship,"' without the explanation from Moody
that an LDA would be evidence that the reason given was pretextual. Id. at
329 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973))). The argument
[Vol. 59:345
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II. BEYOND TITLE VII: APPLICATION OF THE EFFECTS
TEST IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Other Types of Employment Discrimination
The Supreme Court has developed the effects test in cases in-
volving racial discrimination in employment. The same standards
have quite logically also been applied to the other types of discrim-
ination prohibited by Title VII. But in promulgating regulations
under statutes other than Title VII administrative agencies have
also applied similar principles to types of discrimination in em-
ployment not covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The regula-
tions issued under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 197339 are
an outstanding example. The statute was intended to eliminate
discrimination against the handicapped by employers operating
under federal grants. The legislative history was silent on the
question of whether Congress intended the effects test to be appli-
cable; nonetheless, the regulations clearly adopt the Griggs stan-
dard.4O
Such an adoption of the judicial gloss on one statute in the im-
plementation of an apparently similar statute would be not only
unobjectionable but entirely logical if the application of the stan-
dard was costless. But the use of the effects test in the employ-
ment context plainly imposes significant costs on society-even if
one leaves aside intangible values such as the desirability of limit-
ing government interference in private affairs, for the widespread
use of the Griggs standard will almost certainly result in the em-
ployment of a marginally less productive workforce. The most ob-
vious loss of productivity occurs where a job qualification with a
disparate impact has some relationship to job performance, but
the relationship is insufficient to satisfy the standards laid down
from Griggs to Davis. The employer and society lose the addi-
tional productivity that would result from the application of this
standard to job applicants.
But the use of the effects test will probably also result in the
abandonment of some criteria which, if validated, would satisfy the
Griggs-Moody standards. Assume, for example, the situation
would be that by negative inference, the Court's failure to refer to the LDA's
role as mere evidence suggests that the LDA has independent significance.
But Dothard is at best ambiguous on this point; the Court does not define
the role of the LDA, but simply states that the plaintiff may prove its exist-
ence. See 433 U.S. at 329. Thus, it should not be taken as contrary to the
unambiguous pronouncement in Moody, supported by the strong implication
in Beazer, that the LDA is to be treated simply as evidence of improper in-
tent.
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
40. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c) (1979); 45 C.F.R. § 84.13 (1979).
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where a business person is attempting to decide whether to con-
sider x as a factor in making its hiring decisions for a given class of
jobs.4 1 In the absence of government intervention, a rational busi-
nessman will consider x if the cost [c] per hired employee of ob-
taining the information necessary to determine x [c(x)] is less
than the average gain in marginal productivity per hired employee
[m ] which consideration of x produces [m (x) ]-in other words, if
m (x) > c (x). But the existence of the effects test significantly al-
ters the parameters of the hiring businessman's decision. For if
consideration of x has a disparate impact on a protected group, he
must consider not only the cost of obtaining the information neces-
sary to determine x, but also the cost per hired employee of dem-
onstrating that x is job-related [j(x)]. Moreover, the likelihood
that the employer will be sued under anti-discrimination laws is
increased whenever he considers a criterion with a disparate im-
pact, and thus he must also consider potential litigation costs
[I(x) ], in making his decision on whether to consider factor x.
Thus the economically rational employer will only consider factor
x if: m(x) > c(x)+j(x)+l(x). Obviously, there will be times
when: c(x) < m (x) _ c(x)+j(x)+l(x). In those cases, the em-
ployer will not consider factor x, although he would have consid-
ered the factor if the effects test were not legally mandated. Thus,
the employer (as well as the economy as a whole) will lose an av-
erage amount of productivity equal to m(x) - c(x).42
41. In the example which follows, the following symbols will be used: x = poten-
tial factor to be used in hiring decisions; c = cost of obtaining information; m
= marginal productivity per hired employee; j = cost per hired employee of
demonstrating that a factor is job-related, I = cost of litigation.
42. In fairness it must be noted that it is theoretically possible for the application
of the effects test to result in a marginally more productive workforce. As-
sume that an employer considers two criteria-a and b-in evaluating appli-
cants for employment. Assume further that despite the employer's
conviction that both factors are correlated with productivity, only b is in fact
so related. To the extent that the employer prefers employees with a smaller
b factor because they have a larger a factor, the productivity of his workforce
will be reduced.
Now consider the situation in which a also has a disparate impact. Be-
cause he will not be able to show a business purpose for the use of a, the
employer will be required by Title VII to abandon its use in employment de-
cisions. Forced to rely only on b, the employer will obtain a more productive
workforce.
But there are good reasons to believe that situations where an employer is
considering factors such as a will be rare and generally of limited duration.
Unit costs for employers considering a will be higher and thus they will be
placed at a competitive disadvantage; unless they abandon the use of this
criterion they will lose business to their more efficient competitors who will
be able to charge lower prices for identical products. Moreover, employers
gain no advantage from considering irrelevant criteria. Thus where it is im-
possible to show a statistical correlation between a given criterion and job
[Vol. 59:345
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Given these observations, it becomes clear that the application
of the effects test acts as a mild form of preferential treatment for
protected groups. Consider, for example, a situation in which
there are 200 applicants (100 white and 100 black) for 100 job open-
ings. Assume that in the absence of Title VII, the employer would
consider the x factor in judging applications. Assume further that
if he does consider x he will hire eighty whites and twenty blacks,
but that if he does not consider x then he will hire fifty whites and
fifty blacks. If c(x) < m(x) < c(x)+j(x)+ I(x), then the exist-
ence of the effects test will result in thirty blacks displacing thirty
whites, notwithstanding that the whites are objectively better
qualified for the position. This would be a classic case of preferen-
tial treatment on the basis of race.43
The justification for mandating such treatment in cases involv-
ing racial discrimination begins with the assumption that race per
se is not only irrelevant to merit but also uncorrelated with those
factors which determine merit. Given this assumption (which un-
derlies much of the law dealing with racial discrimination), one
would normally expect that in any two randomly selected group of
100 whites and 100 blacks, an equal number of whites and blacks
would possess the qualification for any given job. Where such is
not the case-as it is generally not in our society-the most plausi-
ble conclusion is that the failure of the blacks to possess the rele-
vant qualifications is the result of either societal discrimination
directly against the underachieving group, or the lingering effects
of discrimination against the ancestors of that group. The loss of
productivity may be viewed as the cost which society is willing to
bear to redress the effects of past discrimination. The imposition
performance, it seems logical to assume that the criterion has unquantifiable
benefit, rather than no business justification whatsoever. See, e.g., Yuhas v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977) (no nepotism rule). See
generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 n.21 (1973).
43. If one is committed to a program of preferential treatment, then the use of the
effects test has significant advantages. It in no sense operates as a quota sys-
tem; there is no assurance that any particular number of members of any
race will obtain employment. Instead, members of all races compete equally
for jobs with the decision being based upon a reduced number of criteria.
Thus, the use of the effects test increases the number of employment oppor-
tunities available to blacks while avoiding the appearance of inherent unfair-
ness. Cf. Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (condemning use of quota systems by government).
Moreover, the damage done to basic meritocratic principles by the use of
the effects test is inherently self-limited. All criteria with disparate impacts
are not condemned; only the use of those criteria which cannot be shown to
have a business purpose is proscribed. Thus the Griggs standard clearly es-
tablishes that whatever the strength of the social concern in redressing the
effects of past discrimination, there will be times when other legitimate inter-
ests outweigh this concern.
19801
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of such costs on employers will result in their being spread
throughout society through the operation of the market system.
Nor is the theory that the effects test is grounded in part on the
need to redress the effects of past discrimination based entirely on
speculation; language in the Supreme Court opinions discussing
the effects test strongly suggests such considerations influenced
the decision to focus on disparate impact in Title VII cases. In
Griggs, when discussing the use of the standardized test which
was at issue, the Court noted that "[b] asic intelligence must have
the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing proc-
ess. Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received in-
ferior education in segregated schools . . . ."44 In McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green,45 the majority of the Court declined to fol-
low the effects test, distinguishing Griggs as a case in which the
Court "was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the ed-
ucation and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces
beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and in-
vidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives."46
From these passages it can fairly be inferred that one factor un-
derlying the Griggs decision was a desire to ease the burden which
past discrimination has imposed on blacks. But this rationale does
not apply with equal force to discrimination against other groups-
for example the handicapped. No doubt in some cases disabled
persons are denied jobs solely on the basis of prejudice. But
where a handicapped person is denied a job because he is unable
to satisfy a qualification imposed in good faith by the employer,
one can hardly assume that the disabled person's failure to acquire
the qualification is the result of societal discrimination. By defini-
tion, a handicapped person is one who suffers from some unusual
limitation in his ability to perform life functions.4 7 His failure to
meet the qualifications may well be the direct result of such a limi-
tation, rather than some unfair treatment by society of the handi-
capped as a group. Thus the argument for application of the effects
test or any other device liable to result in preferential treatment is
significantly weakened.48
Nonetheless, in promulgating regulations interpreting prohibi-
44. 401 U.S. at 430.
45. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (Green was a case alleging racial discrimination against an
individual, rather than a class-based suit as were Griggs and its progeny).
46. Id. at 806.
47. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1979).
48. The same argument could have been made with respect to the job qualifica-
tions challenged in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), discussed in
text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. Certainly the difference in the average
heights and weights of men and women cannot be viewed as the result of
societal discrimination. The application of the effects test in Dothard there-
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tions against discrimination against the handicapped in employ-
ment the responsible agencies have, with virtually no discussion,
indicated that the effects test is to be applied. Of course, it is possi-
ble that the factors other than those discussed herein might justify
the adoption of the Griggs approach even in the absence of legisla-
tive history mandating such an approach. But the failure of the
responsible agencies to identify such factors suggests an insensi-
tivity to those considerations which indicates that a different ap-
proach might be more appropriate in dealing with the problem of
discrimination against the handicapped.
B. Discrimination Other than in Employment
L Housing
Since its emergence in cases dealing with employment discrim-
ination, the influence of the effects test in the lower courts has
spread to other facets of anti-discrimination law as well. For exam-
ple, in United States v. City of Black Jack,49 it was argued that a
city had violated the Fair Housing Act 50 by adopting a zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting any further construction of multi-family dwell-
ing units in the face of an attempt by builders to construct a
complex of townhouses for low and moderate income families.
The court held that under the Act, in order to establish a prima
facie case of illegal discrimination, "the plaintiff need prove no
more than that the conduct of the defendant actually or predict-
ably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a
discriminatory effect."5 1 If such a showing was made, the court
concluded that the challenged ordinance would fall unless neces-
sary to serve a compelling governmental interest.52 Finding that
the ordinance would have a disparate impact because ninety-nine
percent of the inhabitants of Black Jack were white and the ordi-
nance would have the "ultimate effect" of foreclosing eighty-five
fore cannot be viewed as a device to ameliorate the effects of such discrimina-
tion.
But discrimination on the basis of sex is banned in Title VII-just as is
racial discrimination; thus to have departed from the Griggs standards in
Dothard would have been incongruous to say the least. By contrast, the Vo-
cational Rehabilitation Act is entirely separate from Title VII. Given this
fact, a separate analysis of the meaning of the term "discrimination" seems
entirely appropriate. Cf. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (dif-
fering concepts of discrimination under different sections of Title VII).
49. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). See also, Metro-
politan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), .cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976).
51. 508 F.2d at 1184.
52. Id. at 1186.
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percent of the blacks in the relevant metropolitan area from ob-
taining housing there,5 3 the court struck down the ordinance be-
cause the necessary justification had not been provided.
In evaluating the Black Jack approach, one must begin by rec-
ognizing that local land use authorities have traditionally enjoyed
very great latitude in the objectives which they are permitted to
pursue;5 4 insofar as the federal courts have been concerned, this
discretion has been limited only by the explicit provisions of the
Constitution. Further, in pursuit of many of these objectives, the
local government must of necessity implement policies which have
a disparate impact. For example, any attempt to preserve or raise
property values lessens the opportunity for the poor to obtain
housing in a given area. Since blacks represent a disproportionate
number of the poor, such actions will necessarily have a disparate
impact.
Given this situation, if the effects test is to be applied meaning-
fully to zoning decisions and the like, then some formulation must
be found which acceptably limits the range of objectives open to
local governmental authorities. The approach of the Black Jack
court was to require that the challenged action be necessary to
serve a "compelling" governmental interest 5 5-a phrase borrowed
from equal protection analysis under the Constitution. This stan-
dard of review has been described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact" by one noted commentator.56 This is something of an over-
53. This concept of a disparate impact differs somewhat from that generally ap-
plied in Title VII cases. Under Title VII, the focus of disparate impact analy-
sis is on the particular employment practice being challenged. While
statistics on the overall composition of the employer's workforce may give
rise to an implication that the employer is intentionally engaging in a "pat-
tern or practice" of deliberate discrimination, see, e.g., Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), such statistics alone are not enough
to condemn any particular practice under the effects test. But cf. Smith v.
Troyan 520 F.2d 492, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1975) (where overall employment crite-
rion has no disparate impact, fact that part of criterion had such impact does
not establish prima facie case).
If this approach had been adopted in Black Jack, the court would have
found that the challenged ordinance did not have a disparate impact. Taken
alone, it would have excluded 29% of the white families and 32% of the black
families in the relevant metropolitan area. See 508 F.2d at 1186. This differ-
ence is insufficient to establish the degree of the disparate impact which
proves a prima facie case. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1979).
54. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
55. 508 F.2d at 1185.
56. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine On a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). See also,
e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-
89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
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statement even in the equal protection context;57 nonetheless,
given the near-inevitability of disparate impact in land-use regula-
tion, application of this approach would result in a deep intrusion
of the traditional prerogatives of local governments.
First, the range of objectives which they would appropriately
seek to achieve would be drastically reduced; rather than being
limited solely by the Constitution, land-use authorities would be
restricted to that narrow range of interests which could be appro-
priately deemed "compelling." But equally important, local gov-
ernments would be faced with the task of demonstrating that the
means chosen was necessary to the furtherance of these compel-
ling concerns. This second step will often be particularly difficult
in cases involving land-use regulation, where the goal is likely to
involve unquantifiable values such as the improvement or preser-
vation of the ambience of a community. Consider for example, a
denial of a permit to build a multi-unit, low-income housing project
on the ground that it would disrupt the aesthetics of an area domi-
nated by single-family homes. It is well established that consider-
ations of aesthetics are within the purview of local land-use
authorities; 58 nonetheless, (assuming that the denial of the permit
was found to have a disparate impact) under the Black Jack ap-
proach the court would be forced to independently reevaluate the
justification proffered in support of the denial. Yet there are no
readily apparent objective standards to guide the court in making
such a judgment; the only alternative would seem to be for the
court to make its own independent evaluation of the aesthetic
needs of the relevant community.
In short, the application of the Black Jack approach to the Fair
Housing Act would radically alter the respective roles of local gov-
ernment and the federal courts in land-use control affecting hous-
ing patterns. Certainly if Congress had intended such a result, one
would expect to find some indication of that intention in the legis-
lative history of the Act. But the Black Jack opinion cites no such
authority. Thus it seems inappropriate to infer from the bare pro-
hibition against racial discrimination in housing that the Griggs-
Moody standards should be applied to local governmental deci-
sions affecting housing patterns. 59
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (state law
survives strict scrutiny); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per curiam)
(same).
58. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); State ex rel. Stoyanoff v.
Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
59. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 & n.14 (1976) (noting that applica-
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2. Discrimination in the Granting of Credit
The application of the effects test to cases involving discrimina-
tion in the granting of credit is far less problematical. First, the
legislative history of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 6o [ECOA]
clearly indicates that Congress intended that the Griggs-Moody
standards govern the implementation of that Act.6 1 Moreover, un-
like cases involving governmental land-use regulations, the legiti-
mate objectives of the creditor can be appropriately limited to
determining the likelihood that a given prospective borrower will
repay his loan on time. Further, the relationship between many
factors and this objective can be relatively easily established and
quantified.62
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to uncritically transfer all of
the concepts developed in connection with the effects test under
Title VII to problems arising under ECOA. For example, in cases
involving disparate impact, the regulations under Title VII gov-
erning the use of tests as criteria for employment state that any
cut-off score must be consistent with "normal expectations of profi-
ciency" in the workforce.63 Such a requirement is entirely sensible
in the context of the application of the effects test to discrimination
in employment; certainly it would be antithetical to the entire con-
cept of the effects test to totally exclude an applicant from consid-
eration for a given position on the basis of a score which indicated
that he could perform the necessary job functions in an appropri-
ate manner.
But the process of evaluating applications for credit differs sig-
nificantly from that of choosing among applicants for employment.
tion of the effects test in constitutional cases might result in disruption of
many governmental functions).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
ECOA deals with discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, sex, marital status, age, the fact that all or part of an applicant's
income derives from any public assistance program or the fact that the appli-
cant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act or any state law accepted by the Federal Reserve Board as an
approved substitute for that Act.
61. See S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE,
CONG. & AD. NEWS 403, 406; H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
See also 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 n.7 (1979) (administrative regulation adopting ef-
fects test).
62. The problem of quantification of the factors affecting decisions and relating
those factors to performance has been a recurring one in Title VII cases, par-
ticularly where employment and promotion decisions have been based on
subjective judgments. See, e.g., United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534
F.2d 805, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 299 (1977);
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6 (1979).
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A prospective employer is likely to first decide how many positions
there were to be filled and then choose among the qualified appli-
cants to obtain the fixed number necessary to fill those positions.
By contrast, a creditor is more likely to determine an appropriate
level of profitability from each loan, and then to extend credit in all
cases which he judges will generate this level of profitability (as
measured by the interest rate and the creditor's estimate of the
likelihood of repayment of the loan). In such a context, the ana-
logue of a "normal expectation of efficiency" would be an appropri-
ate level of profitability. The argument would be that where a cut-
off score was set to achieve profitability above this level and a
lower cut-off score would have a smaller disparate impact, then the
creditor must use the lower score as his cut-off point.
But this seems an unlikely reading of ECOA; it would trans-
form an anti-discrimination statute into a device for controlling the
profit margins of creditors. Moreover, the regulations implement-
ing the statute imply that such a reading would be inappropriate.
The regulations define a demonstrably and statistically sound, em-
pirically derived credit system which is "developed for the purpose
of predicting the credit worthiness of applicants with respect to the
legitimate business interests of the creditor utilizing the system,
including.., minimizing bad debt losses and operating expenses
in accordance with the creditor's business judgment."64 This sec-
tion clearly contemplates that the creditor should be allowed to
make his own decision regarding what constitutes an acceptable
level of bad debt losses (and by extension, profit). The provision
does not apply to all credit allocation systems, nor is it directly tied
to the discussion of the effects test in the regulation. Nonetheless,
it stands as an important indication that the effects test should not
be used as a vehicle to evaluate cut-off scores under ECOA.
Of course, the question of cut-off scores is not the only (or per-
haps even the most important) difficulty involved in applying the
effects test to the problem of discrimination in the granting of
credit.65 It does, however, illustrate the difficulties which can arise
64. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p) (2) (ii) (1979) (emphasis added).
All systems which do not qualify as demonstrably and statistically sound,
empirically derived credit systems are judgmental systems. 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.2(t) (1979). The creditor who uses a demonstrably and statistically
sound, empirically derived system is given slightly more flexibility in use of
information; for example, he may consider the age of an applicant so long as
the age of an elderly person is not assigned a negative factor or value. 12
C.F.R. § 202.6(b) (2) (1979).
65. For more detailed discussions of the problems of adapting the effects test to
ECOA, see Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30
HASTINGs L.J. 371 (1978); Maltz & Miller, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
and Regulation B, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 25-46 (1978); Note, Credit Scoring and
the ECOA: Applying the Effects Test, 88 YALE L.J. 1450 (1979).
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when the details of the Title VII approach are applied in other con-
texts, even where the basic Griggs analysis is plainly applicable.
III. CONCLUSION
This comment is not intended to be an exhaustive study of the
problems associated with the application of the effects test in all
contexts. Instead, it is simply an attempt to point out the dangers
of automatically adopting the Griggs-Moody approach whenever a
statute prohibits discrimination against a given group. The effects
test is strong medicine, developed to deal with a particular type of
discrimination in a limited context. Even when applied within that
context, it raises difficult problems; when transferred to other ar-
eas, these problems are often magnified.
Unfortunately, some courts and administrative agencies seem
to be oblivious to these problems. Particularly when dealing with
problems of discrimination against the handicapped in employ-
ment and racial discrimination, the effects test seems to have been
adopted almost as a reflex, with no thought apparently given to the
implications of and problems associated with the application of the
Griggs-Moody approach. Hopefully, in the future, Congress, the
courts and administrative agencies will be more sensitive to the
difficulties in formulating the standards for implementing anti-dis-
crimination laws.
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